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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tension in the legal tradition of the United States
exists between the principle that "ignorance of the law or a mis-
take of law is no defense"' and the contrary "fair notice" princi-
ple which holds that persons may not be punished for failing to comply
* Mr. Wilkins is an attorney in the environmental section of Bracewell & Patterson,
L.L.P., Houston, Texas. He is also an adjunct professor teaching environmental law at the
University of Houston Law Center. He received a law degree from Harvard Law School
and a Master's in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
1. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1990). See also Staples v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 n.3 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S.
601, 612 (1971) (Brennan, J. concurring) (describing principle that "ignorance of law is no
excuse" as an "ancient maxim" of continuing validity).
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with standards of which they could not have been aware. 2 In recent
years, the latter principle has begun to take root in the law of the admin-
istrative state, having been invoked in several decisions to strike down
punishments prescribed by an agency for violations of unclear regula-
tions.3 These decisions have emphasized the invalidity of regulatory in-
terpretations that are not readily ascertainable from either the plain
language of the regulations4 or the published guidance of which the re-
spondent individual was aware.5 This thread of analysis points to a sepa-
rate tension between the "fair notice" principle and principles of
deference to expert agency interpretations 6 as found in Chevron, U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.7 and its progeny. Combining
each of these various elements, the courts have formed a doctrine that
some commentators have labeled "regulatory confusion," an apt term
for situations in which the meaning or an agency's interpretations of regu-
lations cannot readily be understood by persons to whom those regula-
tions apply.
In May 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided
General Electric Co. v. EPA,9 a case dealing with the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations and interpretations
governing the treatment and disposal of toxic polychlorinated biphenyl
wastes.' 0 The General Electric court concluded that because its regula-
tory interpretation was so unusual, EPA failed to provide General Elec-
tric Company (GE) with constitutionally sufficient fair warning of the
standard with which EPA expected it to comply." Under those circum-
stances, the court held, the regulatory interpretation in question could
not be enforced against GE as a matter of due process. 12 This Essay will
discuss the key background case law leading to General Electric,13 de-
2. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963)
("[Criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand
that his contemplated conduct is proscribed."); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939).
3. Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1991): Gates & Fox Co.
v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645
(5th Cir. 1976); In re Phibro Energy USA, Inc., EPA, No. CAA-R6-P-9-LA-92002, 1994
WL 594881 (E.P.A. Oct. 5, 1994).
4. General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Gates & Fox, 790 F.2d at
156-57; Diamond Roofing, 528 F.2d at 649.
5. Phibro at *4-5.
6. See, e.g., Rollins, 937 F.2d at 652-53 (sustaining the agency's interpretation, but
also holding that lack of clarity and resulting lack of notice required no penalty to be
assessed).
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. Margaret N. Strand, The "Regulatory Confusion" Defense to Environmental Penal-
ties: Can You Beat the Rap?, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330 (May 1992), available in
WESTLAW, 22 ELR 10330.
9. 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
10. Id. at 1325-27.
11. Id. at 1333-34.
12. Id. at 1334.
13. See infra part II. A more searching review of the background case law is found in
the excellent article by Strand, supra note 8.
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scribe the several iterations of the General Electric case itself, 14 and ana-
lyze the future prospects of the regulatory confusion defense in light of
the General Electric court's treatment of the administrative law principles
of fair notice and agency deference.15
II. THE DOCTRINE OF REGULATORY CONFUSION:
PRECURSORS OF GENERAL ELECTRIC
The General Electric decision is the culmination of an intermittent line
of administrative law cases. 16 The precedential thread began with a pair
of occupational safety decisions, the first of which appeared in the Fifth
Circuit in 1976 and the second of which arrived a decade later in the D.C.
Circuit. The doctrine of regulatory confusion received its biggest pre-
General Electric boost in 1991, however, when that court decided Rollins
Environmental Services, Inc. v. EPA.17 Following those earlier prece-
dents on regulatory confusion, Rollins explored the issues in question
deeply and on the basis of a regulatory confusion-based analysis (despite
the company's failure to properly argue regulatory confusion as a matter
of constitutional due process) struck down penalties EPA had assessed. 18
The final pre-General Electric landmark in the evolution of regulatory
confusion doctrine arrived in In re Phibro Energy USA, Inc. v. EPA,19 a
case in which EPA's own administrative law judges recognized in strong
terms the application of the doctrine as an antidote to conflicting agency
interpretations of an ambiguous rule.
A. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REVIEW
COMMISSION CASES
1. The Diamond Roofing Decision
In 1976, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the
case of several roofing companies that, by order of the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), had been penalized
for failing to install railings around level but open-sided roofs upon which
their employees worked. The relevant OSHA construction regulations
required that a standard railing be placed around open-sided floors.20
14. See infra part III.
15. See infra part IV.
16. Not only have there been periods of several years separating the key regulatory
confusion cases discussed below, but there have also been a number of cases recognizing
the general principles of the regulatory confusion doctrine (although applying it narrowly
to reject a defendant's claim of confusion). See United States v. Cumberland Farms of
Conn., Inc., 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987); Yaffe Iron and Metal Co. v. EPA, 774 F.2d 1008
(10th Cir. 1985); Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158 (D.N.J. 1989) affd in part and rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 649 F.
Supp. 347 (D.D.C. 1986).
17. 937 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
18. Id. at 654.
19. No. CAA-R6-P-9-LA-92002, 1994 WL 594881 (E.P.A. Oct. 5, 1994).
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(d)(1) (1985).
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OSHRC viewed the roofs in question as open-sided floors and, accord-
ingly, penalized the roofing companies for failing to comply with the
floor-related provisions.
The Fifth Circuit found several reasons rooted in general principles of
statutory construction to reject OSHRC's reading of the regulation, but
was soon confronted with a powerful deference argument by the govern-
ment based on the presumption that the "regulations should be liberally
construed to give broad coverage because of the intent of Congress to
provide safe and healthful working conditions for employees."' 21 Relying
on the existence of intra-agency conflict over the meaning of the provi-
sion in question, policy reasons for insisting upon clarity from regulators,
and the principle that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter
of a text, the court rebuffed the liberal construction argument, explaining
that the regulated community was "entitled to fair notice in dealing with"
the agency. 22
Ultimately, the court held that "a regulation cannot be construed to
mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express" and that
it was the Secretary of Labor's "responsibility to state with ascertainable
certainty what is meant by the standards he has promulgated. '23 Thus,
Diamond Roofing stands for the proposition that while deference and
liberal construction generally should be afforded an agency's interpreta-
tion of its own regulations, this principle has no force if enforcing that
interpretation would run afoul of due process-based fair notice
requirements.
2. The Gates & Fox Decision
A decade later, the D.C. Circuit confronted a comparable OSHRC or-
der arising from a charge that the Gates & Fox Company had violated a
safety regulation requiring companies that excavate tunnels and shafts to
provide their workers with rescue equipment.24 OSHRC had read a
phrase in the relevant regulation as a "catch-all" clause requiring compa-
nies to provide rescue equipment both in specified areas and in "other
areas where employees might be trapped by smoke or gas."'25
Following Diamond Roofing, the court reversed that final agency deci-
sion, properly recognizing that "[c]ourts must give deference to an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. '26 The court held that
"[w]here the imposition of penal sanctions is at issue, however, the due
process clause prevents that deference from validating the application of
a regulation that fails to give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or
requires. '2 7 Using traditional conventions of statutory construction, the
21. Diamond Roofing, 528 F.2d at 649.
22. Id. at 649.
23. Id.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.800(b)(3).





court explained that the regulation "would reasonably be read to refer
only to" the specified areas and places near such areas requiring rescue
equipment.28 In Judge Scalia's opinion, the preferred reading of the reg-
ulation's plain language would not support the government's position.29
As a consequence, the regulation "fail[ed] to give fair notice that self-
rescuers are required in all areas where employees could be trapped by
smoke or gas."' 30 Because "the regulation failed to provide adequate
notice of the conduct it prohibited," sanctions could not constitutionally
be imposed on the Gates & Fox Company.31
Gates & Fox represents a significant development because, unlike Dia-
mond Roofing, it expressly relied on constitutional due process consider-
ations as the basis of the "fair warning" principle, giving respondents a
"trump card" in disputes over ambiguous rules. Further, Gates & Fox
fleshed out the role of deference to agency interpretations outlined in
Diamond Roofing, noting that even if an agency's interpretation of the
regulation is permissible, the regulatory confusion doctrine, where appli-
cable, will bar enforcement thereof.32 Notably, the court explained that
even if the respondent had actual notice or reason to believe it was sub-
ject to a rule, the regulatory confusion doctrine would still bar imposition
of sanctions unless "warning" had been provided in the form of "an au-
thoritative [agency] interpretation. '33
B. THE ROLLINS CASE
The D.C. Circuit, in Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. EPA,34 ad-
dressed the regulatory confusion doctrine for the first time in an environ-
mental law context. Under EPA regulations, solvents may be used to
remove hazardous polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from various equip-
ment or containers. 35 According to the regulation at issue in Rollins,
"[t]he solvent may be reused for decontamination until it contains 50
[parts per million] PCB. The solvent shall then be disposed of as a PCB
in accordance with [section] 761.60(a)" of the Toxic Substances Control
Act. 36 Rollins triple-rinsed a concrete basin with solvent and, finding that
it still contained less than 50 parts per million (ppm) of PCBs, destroyed
the solvent in an incinerator that had not been approved for PCB dispo-
sal by EPA.37 Six year later, Rollins was surprised to find itself defending
an EPA enforcement action. By all appearances, Rollins had logically
and literally read the regulation as placing rigorous disposal requirements
only on solvents containing PCBs in concentrations exceeding 50 ppm.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 156-57.
30. Id. at 156.
31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 156-57.
33. Id. at 157.
34. 937 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
35. 40 C.F.R. § 761.79 (1996).
36. Id. § 761.79(a).
37. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 651.
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After a series of hearings, briefings, decisions, and reversals on this issue
during EPA's adjudicative process, however, the Chief Judicial Officer of
EPA ordered Rollins to pay a $25,000 penalty for the alleged violation.38
Rollins petitioned the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for judicial
review of this final EPA ruling.
The decision of the Rollins court begins by explaining the competing
regulatory interpretations it faced. Rollins read the regulation to mean
that solvents could be used until they reached 50 ppm and that "then"
they had to be disposed of in a particular fashion.39 Under this reading,
the word "then" conditions application of the heightened disposal stan-
dard upon the 50 ppm threshold. EPA, on the other hand, argued that
the word "then" simply referred to the end of rinsing, regardless of
whether the solvents had reached 50 ppm or not.4 0 The solvent, regard-
less of PCB concentration, had become a PCB through contact with PCBs
and needed to be disposed as such. The court described the latter reading
as "rather more strained. '41
While the court recognized that Rollins's interpretation was more plau-
sible than EPA's, it acknowledged that agency interpretations of regula-
tions were due substantial deference. As a result, it decided over a strong
opinion, dissenting in part,42 that EPA's strained interpretation would be
upheld as correct based on this deference.4 3 Despite this holding, though,
the court refused on the basis of Rollins's regulatory confusion argument
to impose any penalty.44 Finding that there had been significant conflict
in the guidance that EPA's regional offices had provided on the meaning
of the provision in question, the court endorsed Rollins's argument that
"the regulated community" cannot "be considered to be 'on notice as to
the obligations' . . . if EPA is uncertain as to what the obligations are."45
Notably, the due process argument, which typically supplies the author-
ity for the regulatory confusion defense,46 was rejected by the Rollins ma-
jority on procedural grounds. 47 Rollins had failed to raise that particular
basis in its opening brief. Nonetheless, the court reached a result roughly
consistent with that found in the previously discussed regulatory confu-
sion cases.48 As one commentator explained it, "[T]he court held that




42. Judge Edwards's separate opinion insisted that, as a matter of "hornbook law,"
where a regulation is sufficiently ambiguous that the regulated community "could not rea-
sonably have known what the agency had in mind" there can be neither penalty nor viola-
tion. Id. at 654 & n.1. (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 652-53.
44. Id. at 654.
45. Id. at 653 n.2 (quoting Respondent's Reply Brief at 8).
46. Strand, supra note 8, at 10,334-36.
47. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 653 n.2.
48. As the separate opinion of Judge Edwards pointed out, the majority's decision
merely to bar the imposition of a penalty is not the same as a holding that regulatory
confusion prevents any finding of violation. Id. at 655. Judge Edwards would not have
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EPA's regulations were so confusing that even though Rollins had vio-
lated the rules, it did not have to pay any penalty." 49
The Rollins court offered at least two alternative reasons for its hold-
ing. First, a holding by EPA that the regulation was "clear" was found to
be arbitrary where (1) the agency itself had admitted internal conflict
over the provision's meaning; and (2) conflicting advice had been given
by the agency to the regulated community.50 Even the officer finding the
regulation to be clear acknowledged that the regulatory language was
equally supportive of the two conflicting constructions at issue. 51
Second, under the environmental statute in question EPA is required in
assessing penalties to take into account the nature, circumstances, extent,
and gravity of the violation; the culpability of the alleged violator; and
other matters required to do justice.52 "In light of the ambiguity of the
regulation, the nature of the actions taken by Rollins, and the absence of
deleterious consequences, we agree with the second [administrative law
judge] that imposing a monetary penalty on Rollins would be without
justification. '53 The court also hinted at a separate basis for its decision
given the intra-agency conflict on interpretations of the regulation. Spe-
cifically, the court found that "depending on which official responded to
the inquiry, EPA might have given Rollins the opposite advice. The im-
position of a serious penalty cannot rest on such fortuity." 54
Rollins thus implicitly reaffirmed the foundations for a constitutional
due process challenge to ambiguous regulations without reaching the con-
stitutional issue, while adding at least two non-constitutional regulatory
confusion objections, each of which lead to roughly the same result. No-
tably, however, Rollins weakened the regulatory confusion doctrine to
some degree by expressly limiting the effect of a showing of non-constitu-
tional regulatory confusion to a bar on the imposition of penalties-
rather than a voiding of the violation itself-where regulations are am-
biguous. Perhaps more importantly, while vindicating Rollins to some
degree, the decision left largely unanswered the crucial precedential
questions of what standard reviewing courts should apply in assessing
regulatory ambiguity.55
upheld the agency's interpretation as enforceable at all. Id. at 657. Barring monetary pen-
alties alone does not achieve the necessary result because "the violation found is still a
significant penalty. Not only has Rollins been unfairly labelled a 'law breaker,' but this
violation can be used against the company in assessing penalties with respect to any future
violations." Id. at 654 n.2. The Gates & Fox and Diamond Roofing decisions appeared not
to have reached the issue raised by this distinction.
49. Strand, supra note 8, at 10,330.
50. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 653.
51. Id.
52. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)(B) (1996).
53. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 654.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Strand, supra note 8, at 10,333.
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C. THE PHIBRO CASE
In a somewhat surprising move,56 EPA itself adopted the reasoning of
Diamond Roofing, Gates & Fox, and Rollins in an administrative law
judge's (ALJ) opinion in In re Phibro Energy USA, Inc.57 In Phibro,
EPA charged the respondent with failing to timely conduct a perform-
ance test on continuous emissions monitors (CEMs).5 8 EPA asserted that
the regulation requiring the CEMs to be installed at various facilities
mandated that performance tests on those units be completed by the
same date.5 9 The plain reading of the regulations suggested, however,
that the performance test was to be completed pursuant to 40 C.F.R. sec-
tion 60.8, which, read together with the applicable regulation, allowed 210
days following installation to satisfactorily test the performance of the
CEMs. 60 The ALJ held:
[T]he regulations simply do not say what Complainant contends that
they say, although EPA's desire to interpret them in this manner is
understandable. Moreover, no formal policy statement of which Re-
spondent should have been aware-such as a preamble in a Federal
Register publication of the rules-has been pointed to as a contrary
indication to the language of the rules. Accordingly, the regulations
at issue here did not give fair notice of what EPA expected the regu-
lated community to do by way of compliance. 61
As a result, the ALJ concluded that "[w]here, as here, a penalty is sought
for an alleged violation of an at best ambiguous regulation, and the regu-
lation fails to give fair warning of the conduct it requires, a penalty can-
not be assessed against Respondent consistent with the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. '62
Attempting to bridge the constitutional-nonconstitutional confusion
created by the Rollins court, the ALJ asserted a distinction between two
types of cases. In the first type, ambiguous regulations offend due pro-
cess, and in this instance, no violation may be found. In the second type,
the ambiguity renders it unfair to assess a penalty even though enforcing
the questionable interpretation may not offend due process. In this in-
stance, a violation may be found, but no penalty may be assessed. Trying
to make sense of the reasoning in Rollins appears quite difficult; indeed,
the stern partial dissent in Rollins made much of the oddness of a logic
which could result in two dramatically different outcomes over assertions
of a regulation's ambiguity depending upon whether due process was for-
56. But see Rollins, 937 F.2d at 655 (Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) ("Ithe Agency has repeatedly ruled against enforcement staff where the applicable
rules ... were fatally ambiguous").
57. No. CAA-R6-P-9-LA-92002, 1994 WL 594881 (E.P.A. Oct. 5, 1994).
58. Id. at *1.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *34.
61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. at *5.
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mally advanced as the basis for the argument in question. 63 Even more
confounding is the complete absence of a proposed method by which to
distinguish constitutional from subconstitutional regulatory confusion in
cases where both bases are advanced. Despite the Phibro case's unper-
suasive attempt to mediate the conflicting views of the two opinions in
Rollins, the decision is nonetheless very significant as a strongly-worded,
EPA-specific administrative precedent in favor of the regulatory confu-
sion doctrine. Phibro demonstrated the willingness of an ALJ under the
purview of EPA to recognize that agency's fallibility.
III. THE GENERAL ELECTRIC CASE
Turning to the General Electric Co. v. EPA decision in which the line of
regulatory confusion cases culminate, this Essay will briefly summarize
the history of that case and then address the various significant doctrinal
issues and tensions which are likely to emerge in future judicial treat-
ments of the regulatory confusion principle.
A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OF THE GENERAL
ELECTRIC CASE
For several months in 1987, General Electric Company (GE) instituted
a process to help its customers prepare for the disposal of their electrical
equipment-generally transformers-which contained PCBs.64 After
draining from the transformers the dielectric fluid, a mineral oil which
often contained PCBs, GE would refill the transformers with a freon-
based solvent to rinse the equipment of regulated quantities of PCBs. 65
Once the transformers were properly cleaned, the solvent was drained off
into distillation units.66 The distillation process separated PCBs out of
the solvent solution in a recycling process, leaving behind three streams:
one composed of cleaned transformers which were properly shipped to
an approved landfill for disposal; one composed of concentrated PCBs
which were properly shipped for disposal; and the other composed of a
cleaned (i.e., less than 50 ppm of PCBs) solvent which was captured for
reuse in the described rinsing process.67
The relevant regulations provide that liquids containing greater than 50
ppm of PCBs be burned in an approved incinerator or a high-efficiency
boiler or be deposited in a landfill specially permitted for hazardous
chemical wastes. 68 Any alternative means of disposal-defined by EPA
as any means of avoiding incineration or disposal in a chemical waste
63. Rollins, 937 F.2d at 655. See also Strand, supra note 8, at 10,334 (discussing the
distinction between regulatory confusion as an argument for mitigation of penalties or as
an affirmative defense to violation).




68. 40 C.F.R. § 761.60(a) (1996).
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landfill-must be preapproved by EPA via permit.69 EPA argued and
both the ALJ and the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) concluded
that by distilling the PCBs out of the solvent liquids, GE was avoiding
required incineration or landfilling of the entire PCB-contaminated sol-
vent liquid. 70 Indeed, reducing the quantity of liquids requiring destruc-
tion pursuant to the PCB regulations was GE's primary motivation in
instituting the distillation process. Under these circumstances, there
should seem to have been little doubt that GE faced potentially serious
charges of noncompliance with the PCB regulations.
What might have seemed cut and dried became complicated, however,
when GE pointed to the following: an additional regulatory provision
authorizing reuse of solvent liquids in totally enclosed processes until
they exceed 50 ppm of PCBs; the plain language of the regulation which
only prohibits destruction of PCBs by unapproved methods; and EPA's
own internal confusion as to whether the distillation process was author-
ized under the regulations. 71 These contentions were to form the basis of
a powerful argument of regulatory confusion that was ultimately adopted
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in General Electric.
Despite appearances of regulatory confusion-especially appearances
arising from evidence provided by GE that one EPA regional office spe-
cifically approved distillation without a permit-EPA Region IV issued a
complaint against GE on May 12, 1989. EPA's complaint alleged unper-
mitted disposal of PCBs and proposed a penalty of $125,000.72 The ALJ
concluded that while a disposal violation had occurred, a penalty of only
$25,000 was warranted based on the limited environmental risk associ-
ated with the distillation method.73
GE appealed this decision to the EAB, arguing that the regulations
were so ambiguous, especially in light of conflicting agency guidance, that
they prevented fair notice of what constituted compliance. 74 In its analy-
sis of the regulatory confusion argument and the application of penalties
for unpermitted use of the distillation method, the EAB affirmed the
ALJ, holding that the Rollins line of cases did not apply. According to
the EAB, the regulation requiring proper disposal of PCB transformers
and liquids was unambiguous. If a party wants to dispose of PCB trans-
formers or liquids, there are two options prescribed by regulation. Addi-
tional options are available only by permit and, without such a permit,
69. Id. § 761.60(e).
70. General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1326-27.
71. Id. at 1331-33.
72. In re General Elec. Co., TSCA Appeal No. 92-2a, 1993 WL 473843, at *8 (E.A.B.
Nov. 1, 1993).
73. Id. at *14. The complaint also contained an allegation that the same process vio-
lated EPA's PCB use regulations. See id. at *10. This allegation, while accepted by the
ALJ, was found by the EAB to be duplicative of the alleged disposal violation, and the
AL's decision was reversed to that extent. See id. at *57. Consequently, this Essay does
not discuss the alleged use violation.
74. Id. at *15.
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"GE did not have the option of improvising on these procedures. '75
Without a permit, GE could not treat otherwise regulated PCB liquids,
thereby largely avoiding the disposal rules that applied to such liquids.
The EAB left the AL's $25,000 penalty assessment for unpermitted dis-
tillation undisturbed. From this final agency decision, GE petitioned the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, relying primarily on the issue
of regulatory confusion.
B. GENERAL ELECTRIC IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT
On petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, the court restated the factual
background of the PCB enforcement matter.76 Thereafter, the court
turned to the two key remaining issues presented by the litigants: First,
whether the agency's interpretation of its regulation was a permissible
construction. 77 Second, whether the imposition of penalties under EPA's
interpretation violated due process under the circumstances. 78
The first issue was resolved with relative brevity by the court in the
government's favor. After discussing the Chevron principle that "an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations" is due "a 'high level of
deference,"' 79 the court held that despite the arguable superiority of GE's
interpretation permitting distillation, principles of deference dictated that
EPA's interpretation would prevail.80
GE's second appeal issue, however, was decisive. The court explained:
Had EPA merely required GE to comply with its interpretation, this
case would be over. But EPA also found a violation and imposed a
fine. Even if EPA's regulatory interpretation is permissible, the
company argues, the violation and fine cannot be sustained consis-
tent with fundamental principles of due process because GE was
never on notice of the agency interpretation it was fined for
violating.81
On this basis, and despite the deference to EPA's regulatory construction,
the D.C. Circuit voided the penalties EPA had assessed against GE, as
well as all of the collateral consequences of the enforcement action.82
The court began its analysis of the due process-regulatory confusion
argument by discussing the doctrinal roots of the "no punishment without
75. Id. at *55.
76. General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1326-27.
77. Id. at 1327-28.
78. Id. at 1328-34.
79. Id. at 1327 (citing General Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, 860 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
80. Id. at 1328.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1334.
EPA thus may not hold GE responsible in any way-either financially or in
future enforcement proceedings-for the actions charged in this case.
Although we conclude that EPA's interpretation of the regulations is permis-
sible, we grant the petition for review, vacate the agency's finding of liability,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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notice" principle. 83 "In the absence of notice-for example, where the
regulation is not sufficiently clear to warn a party about what is expected
of it-an agency may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or
criminal liability," the court wrote.84 Thrning to the more immediate line
of regulatory confusion cases, the court cited Diamond Roofing, Gates &
Fox, and Rollins, as well as several other applicable cases.8 5
In discussing the regulatory confusion issue, the court boiled the doctri-
nal principle down to several iterations of a single standard: (1) available
agency materials addressing the regulation in question must give the reg-
ulated party "fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires"; 86 (2)
the regulated party must be able to "reasonably understand that [its] con-
templated conduct is proscribed";87 (3) the "regulated party acting in
good faith" must be "able to identify, with 'ascertainable certainty,' the
standards with which the agency expects the party to conform";8 8 and (4)
the standards must be "reasonably comprehensible to people of good
faith."' 89 In essence, fair and adequate notice of an interpretation appro-
priate to the circumstances is required. Applying the facts of the case to
this standard, the court held:
Where, as here, the regulations and other policy statements are un-
clear, where the petitioner's interpretation is reasonable, and where
the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive reading of the regu-
latory requirements, a regulated party is not on 'notice' of the
agency's ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and may not be
punished. 90
In addressing the various predecessor cases and in applying this stan-
dard, the court mentioned a number of factors that, in the totality of cir-
cumstances, will lead a court to accept a regulatory confusion defense.
Favorable factors for such a defense are found in situations where: (1)
notice of proscribed conduct is inadequate on the face of the regulations
and other public pronouncements of the agencies; 91 (2) there are internal
contradictions or inconsistencies in the regulations that undermine the
certainty of the agency's interpretations; 92 (3) there are no other pre-en-
forcement efforts or communications which would have put the regulated
party on effective notice;93 (4) agency departments cannot agree on an
interpretation of the regulations94 or the agency interpretation shifts over
83. Id. at 1328-29.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991); Satellite Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 824 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
86. General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1328.
87. Id. at 1329.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1330.
90. Id. at 1333-34.
91. Id. at 1329, 1333.
92. Id. at 1330.
93. Id. at 1329, 1333.
94. Id. at 1329, 1330, 1332.
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time;95 (5) the regulated party's interpretation is more reasonable than
the agency's; 96 (6) traditionally authorized actions or any of the courses
of action available to the regulated party would be punishable under the
agency's interpretations;97 (7) the agency admits a need to clarify the reg-
ulations by offering new regulatory proposals;98 or (8) there is uncertainty
about which regulatory provision controls.99
In the General Electric case, virtually every one of the above factors
converged to favor a finding of regulatory confusion. The regulations,
public pronouncements, and communications by the agency to GE were
ambiguous or conflicting, or both;100 other regulatory provisions sug-
gested GE's conduct was legal; 01 at least one of EPA's Regional offices
took the position that GE's operation was within the scope of the regula-
tions;102 the agency's litigation posture on exactly what rule GE violated
shifted over time;103 GE's reading of the regulations was at least as obvi-
ous-if not more so-than the agency's;10 4 and EPA had proposed new,
"clarifying" regulations to replace the existing provisions. 0 5 Under the
circumstances, the General Electric court properly found that GE was not
on constitutionally sufficient notice that its conduct was proscribed by the
regulations in question. 10 6 While EPA had the prospective authority to
require GE's compliance with its interpretation, penalties could not be
assessed against GE consistent with the "fair notice" principle of due
process.1 07
IV. THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY CONFUSION:
DIVERGENT DOCTRINAL TRAJECTORIES
The General Electric decision takes clear, strong positions on two cen-
tral doctrines in American jurisprudence: fair notice and agency defer-
ence. This Part will discuss the implications of General Electric for those
doctrines and the implications of external turbulence in those doctrinal
fields for the long-term potency of General Electric.
A. GENERAL ELECTRIC AND COMPETING PRINCIPLES ON NOTICE
There is a strong principle in American constitutional law holding that
to comport with due process, a regulated party must be on fair notice as
95. Id. at 1332.
96. Id. at 1331.
97. Id. at 1331, 1332.
98. Id. at 1332.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1331.
102. Id. at 1332.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1334.
105. Id. at 1331-32.




to any conduct the government intends to proscribe. 108 The General
Electric case seizes on this issue, citing to as many as ten prior decisions
embracing this position in various civil, criminal, and administrative con-
texts.10 9 Underlying this position is one central tenet of American juris-
prudence: Persons are not accountable for actions they could not have
known were wrong.110 The insanity plea, the void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, the rule of lenity, disparate treatment of minor or diminished ca-
pacity defendants, and the doctrine of regulatory confusion each grow
from this same root principle.
At the same time, this principle is substantially impaired by a diametri-
cally opposed doctrine, the deeply ingrained notion that "ignorance of
the law is no excuse."'' Indeed, the conflict between "fair notice" rea-
soning and "ignorance of the law" principles has been analyzed in great
detail by many courts and scholars. 112 Despite these careful analyses, no
rule has emerged for consistently balancing the competing principles or
clearly indicating where each applies.1 3 The resolution the courts appear
to have reached is that where a rule of law is really confusing (as opposed
to unclear or simply beyond the understanding of the particular defend-
ant), relief from punishment may be afforded. The General Electric pre-
cedent depends upon precisely this sort of rough balance; no principled
"bright line" supports it over the counterargument that "ignorance of the
law is no excuse."
Indeed, recently the courts have been producing with some regularity
conflicting approaches to claims of ignorance of the law. In United States
v. Weitzenhoff,1' 4 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a facility opera-
tor may be found guilty of criminal violations of the Clean Water Act
even if the operator possessed a good faith belief that a water discharge
108. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1990). See General Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and cases cited therein.
109. General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1328-32.
110. See, e.g., Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199-200; General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1328.
111. A.F. Brooke II, When Ignorance of the Law Became an Excuse: Lambert & Its
Progeny, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 280 (1992).
How could the prosecutor expect to prove, not only the elements of a crime,
but also that the defendant knew his actions to be unlawful? Oliver Wendell
Holmes made it clear: "[E]very one must feel that ignorance of the law could
never be admitted as an excuse, even if the fact could be proved by sight and
hearing in every case."
Id. (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (Little, Brown and Co. reprint)(Mark D. Howe, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1st ed. 1881)).
112. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Am-
biguous, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391 (1994); Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The
Meaning of "Willful" and the Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 397
(1995); Neil S. Cartusciello, Developments in Environmental Criminal Law: Has the Pen-
dulum Begun Its Return?, C964 ALI-ABA 67 (1994), available in WESTLAW; Brooke, supra
note 111; Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter? Statutory Construction Under 42
U.S.C. § 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1993).
113. See, e.g., Vitiello, supra note 112, at 250 (describing "the ambivalence of courts in
defining the law governing ignorance of the law").
114. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995).
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permit expressly authorized the operator's conduct. 115 On the other
hand, in Ratzlaf v. United States,n 6 the Supreme Court found-by a nar-
row 5-4 margin-that certain money laundering laws did not give consti-
tutionally sufficient "fair warning" to the public and, therefore, that the
rule of lenity prohibited construing those laws against the defendant. 117
Conflict over the effect of a defendant's "ignorance of the law" is alive
and well in the federal courts. This conflict-and any changes in doctrine
that result therefrom-will either erode or shore up the due process-fair
notice foundation of General Electric. On its own, General Electric will
stand as a significant precedent in favor of the "fair notice" strand of
these competing doctrinal visions.
B. GENERAL ELECTRIC AND COMPETING PRINCIPLES ON DEFERENCE
TO AGENCY INTERPRETATION
In addition to the struggle over fair notice, there is ongoing doctrinal
tension in the courts over the proper scope of agency discretion. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.118 laid out in
strong form the principle that, where Congress is silent, an agency's statu-
tory construction only needs to be reasonable to be credited by the
courts. 1 9 Under those circumstances, even if an opponent's interpreta-
tion of the law is superior, the agency's construction will be given ef-
fect. 120 Numerous cases arising both before and since Chevron followed
similar rules.121 The doctrine of deference to agency interpretations, re-
ceiving its seminal treatment in Chevron, has become a staple of modern
administrative law.
On one view, General Electric is a strong case in that tradition. Despite
acknowledging that EPA's construction of its regulation was "so far from
a reasonable person's understanding of the regulations that they could
not have fairly informed GE of the agency's perspective,"'1 22 the General
Electric court upheld that interpretation as a "permissible" one. 123 Few
interpretations that are less obvious on the face of a set of regulations
have been upheld by a major federal court as a "permissible" construc-
tion. In this sense, General Electric is a profoundly pro-discretion, pro-
agency decision.
Almost simultaneously, however, the court largely stripped that volley
of its effect. In a move somewhat reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's
115. Id. at 1286.
116. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
117. Id. at 663.
118. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
119. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
120. Id. at 844.
121. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115
S. Ct. 2407 (1995); United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); State of Texas
v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 61 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1995); Hoover & Bracken
Energies, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 723 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1983).
122. General Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1330.
123. Id. at 1327-28.
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ploy in Marbury v. Madison124-the landmark case in which Marshall as-
serted overwhelming judicial authority to overrule unconstitutional laws
under the cover of overruling a much narrower exercise of judicial
power 125-the D.C. Circuit opened its decision by paying remarkably
strong lip service to the Chevron principle of deference to agency inter-
pretations. Quickly, however, the court rendered this portion of its opin-
ion toothless. The court proceeded to suggest, at least implicitly, that, in
cases of first impression, if an agency interpretation needs to lean on the
principle of deference to successfully obtain a judicial endorsement, then
the interpretation is questionable enough to provide constitutionally in-
sufficient warning to the regulated community. The court on the one
hand boldly asserted the continuing vitality of broad Chevron deference
to agencies and then, to an as yet uncertain degree, rendered that doc-
trine virtually meaningless, at least in punitive contexts involving the first
instance application of said construction. In that context, the "fair no-
tice" exception arguably swallows the deference rule.
Outside the context of a vague rule being applied in a first instance,
however, General Electric contains a remarkably broad assertion in favor
of deference. It will stand for the proposition that an otherwise unrea-
sonable agency construction of a statute or regulation is permissible and,
presuming that the agency has published its interpretation in guidance or
used it against other members of the regulated community, that such con-
struction may be used as a basis for penalties. Notably, as a practical
matter the protection from penalties provided by General Electric in
cases where agency interpretations are rendered without proper notice
arguably diminishes the harshness of deference to extremely novel
agency interpretations. Consequently, the two-pronged approach of the
General Electric decision-that is, (1) accepting the general presumption
in favor of agency constructions; and (2) rejecting penalties under such
constructions if they cannot be fairly expected-might be claimed to have
cleared a path for standards for "permissible" interpretations lower than
have been seen heretofore. Where the regulated community is shielded
by General Electric from bizarre or unforeseeable agency interpretations
by the regulatory confusion doctrine, it might be argued, the courts can
be even more broadly deferential to agencies without harsh results. From
this viewpoint, General Electric has the potential to invigorate the doc-
trine of deference to agency interpretations. Nevertheless, the scope of
the deference doctrine is a matter of ongoing controversy in the courts,
and the foundation of the General Electric opinion on deference may be
susceptible to any changes in the deference doctrine.
124. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).




The General Electric case and the regulatory confusion doctrine as a
whole likely will play a substantial role in many future regulatory en-
forcement matters. Environmental and other complex regulatory
schemes are notoriously ambiguous. Agencies have different divisions
and offices which often disagree. They operate under a history of differ-
ent administrations with inconsistent philosophies. They also have a
habit of offering unclear or even conflicting guidance in regulations, Fed-
eral Register preambles, and separate guidance documents. It will not be
hard in many instances to find facial or philosophical inconsistencies in
various policies. As a result, enforcement activities-particularly in sub-
ject matter areas to which enforcement is relatively new-will face a stiff
challenge from assertions of regulatory confusion. The doctrine of regu-
latory confusion will be one of the principal topics of debate in regulatory
enforcement proceedings, both in environmental and other regulatory
contexts. General Electric presents the most articulate and well-reasoned
judicial decision to date on that question and offers substantial food for
thought on the deeper philosophical issues which underlie both the inter-
pretation and application of laws and regulations and the concept of fair
notice in a free society.
At the same time, General Electric's assertion of a broad view of defer-
ence will give substantial comfort to agencies in contexts where (1) the
agencies succeed in maintaining consistency in an interpretation; (2) the
agencies properly publish their interpretation; or (3) the interpretation
has arisen in prior enforcement proceedings. Thus, constructions of regu-
lations that are unreasonable and have little support in the plain reading
of the regulatory language apparently may be found permissible under
General Electric.
General Electric's careful treatment of the issues of deference and due
process is sophisticated and significant. Still, General Electric is a case
which, at its heart, is based on doctrinal positions on ignorance of the law
and on deference that are far from settled. Indeed, the decision is built
around two doctrines rife with internal tensions, each of which has the
potential to rip the holding apart. Further, General Electric is such a
strong case in favor of the regulatory confusion doctrine and in support of
broad agency deference, and it was decided by such a well-respected
court-especially on administrative law issues-that litigants on both
sides of regulatory matters are certain to rely on it repeatedly. Through
this repeated use, the destructive tensions in the fabric of General Electric
will be reviewed in many contexts by court after court. As a result, the
General Electric decision creates opportunities-through its precedential
effect or through its possible overruling on either of the aforementioned
doctrinal grounds-for dramatic precedential shifts in these doctrinal ar-
eas in the near future. General Electric undoubtedly will be a significant
touchstone from which new views on these competing principles will
evolve.
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